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Abstract
What determines the share of public employment, at a given size of the State,
in countries of similar levels of economic development? While the theoretical and
empirical literature on this issue has mostly considered technical dimensions (effi-
ciency and political considerations), this paper emphasizes the role of culture and
quantifies it. We build a representative database for contracting choices of munici-
palities in Switzerland and exploit the discontinuity at the Swiss language border at
identical actual set of policies and institutions to analyze the causal effect of culture
on the choice of how public services are provided. We find that French-speaking bor-
der municipalities are 50% less likely to contract with the private sector than their
German-speaking adjacent municipalities. Technical dimensions are much smaller
by comparison. This result points out that culture is a source of a potential bias
that distorts the optimal choice for public service delivery. Systematic differences in
the level of confidence in public administration and private companies potentially
explain this discrepancy in private sector participation in public services provision.
Keywords: Public service delivery, Contracting out, Make-or-buy decision, Cul-
ture, Regression discontinuity design
JEL codes: D23, D73, H11, H4, L33, Z10
1 Introduction
Once the decision to deliver a public service is made, governments have to choose
between public and private provision. The issue of how effectively to deliver public services
to populations is among the most hotly debated economic policy issues, and is a main
focus on policy debates in the world. Public services are a key determinant of quality
of life that is not measured in per capita income, and they are also an important means
of reducing poverty. However, the public economic literature has historically paid little
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attention to how public services are delivered. The traditional model centers on the State
as the main actor in delivering services and most of the focus has been on setting taxes
and public expenditure levels. But it is now widely acknowledged that government failure
may be as important as market failure and that government intervention should not
correspond to direct provision by government. Government intervention could be indirect
through contracting with the private sector, and the experience of recent years has often
put weight on private alternatives, such as public private partnerships and contracting
out, for a wide range of services ranging from education, health care and transportation
to waste collection and street repair.
To explain government make-or-buy decisions, the theoretical and empirical literature
has mostly considered technical dimensions. One dimension relies on transaction costs and
is similar to private sector make-or-buy decisions, that is, decisions are guided by efficiency
considerations. A central prediction of these efficiency-based theories is that services that
are asset specific or difficult to measure are less likely to be contracted with a private firm
(Williamson, 1985; Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997). This is a pure economic trade-off,
taking as given the preferences of public officials. But these preferences may be subject
to political considerations: The private benefits to politicians of keeping service provision
inside the government (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996). This view holds that factors
that increase the political benefits from in-house provision make private provision less
likely. A mixture of both views is given by Levin and Tadelis (2010): Services that are
characterized by high transaction costs of contracting and services that are ranked high
by city managers in terms of resident sensitivity to quality are less likely to be privately
provided. Empirical studies have corroborated the significance and importance of these
efficiency and political dimensions to explain provision mode choices for public services.
For instance, Levin and Tadelis (2010) find that a one standard deviation increase in
contracting difficulty is associated with about 40% less private contracting.
As the choice of how public services are provided (conditional on delivering the public
service anyway) is neither a question of “more or less state” nor a question of redistributive
policy, the literature has shown none interest and concern about the effect of cultural
background on this economic decision. However, the Figure 1 highlights that, at a given
size of the State, the share of public employment differs widely across countries of similar
levels of economic development, and these differences have been persistent. For instance,
the ratio of public employment over public spending is more than three times bigger
in France than in Germany. This paper challenges the view that there is no room for
culture1, and hence cultural biases, in public service provision.
Our approach to the question is to study the determinants of the make-or-buy decision
for the provision of public services at the level of Swiss municipalities. The municipal level
is an interesting case to deal with contracting choices as many municipalities make deci-
sions about service provision in parallel while they provide a wide range of services, from
very simple to very complex ones. Switzerland, with its four languages that are geograph-
ically clearly delimited, is a great case to study the impact of culture. The explanations
1We adopt here a popular definition of culture among economists, as being the beliefs and values
that are transmitted fairly unchanged from generation to generation. As beliefs and values affect indi-
vidual and group behaviors, they are a central determinant of institutional arrangements: ”Institutional
arrangements and policies, norms, and everyday practices express underlying cultural value emphases in
societies.” (Schwartz, 2004). This is corroborated by a growing empirical literature: Algan and Cahuc
(2009) establish a link between cultural differences and the fact that countries adopt different poli-
cies related to employment protection and unemployment insurance; Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer, and
Zweimu¨ller (2011) show in turn that culture has a causal effect on implemented redistributive policies.
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Figure 1: Public over private employment, by public spending p.c.
Source. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2000).
Public spending in USD $ constant 2000. PPP.
of the links between culture and language are manifold. The so-called Sapir–Whorf hy-
pothesis (Sapir (1921), Whorf (1940)) focuses on intrinsic characteristics of the languages.
Grammatical structures as well as the vocabulary are supposed to affect the perception
of concepts (e.g. time and space, colors, past, present and future) and the worldview.
Recent contributions in this field include Boroditsky, Fuhrman, and McCormick (2011),
who show that language patterns provide Mandarin speakers and English speakers with
a very different perception of the concept of time. Language also captures the vertical
and horizontal transmission of values (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). The vertical channel
to the extent that the native language to which we are exposed during childhood and
adolescence is likely to be an important predictor of our values during adulthood. The
horizontal channel in the sense that language is central to any type of social interaction.
People sharing a common language are more likely to form a social network, and then, to
share common values and common cultural traits. Finally, among the channels of trans-
mission of cultural traits, language is the mostly inherited factor, which allows avoiding
any problem of reverse causality.
The fact that language is a good proxy for culture is especially true in the Swiss context
(Bu¨chi, 2000) where the language border between French and German areas is called
Roestigraben2, emphasizing the fact that this language border is a cultural border. In
addition, as highlighted in Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer, and Zweimu¨ller (2011), Novembre,
Johnson, Bryc, Kutalik, Boyko, Auton, Indap, King, Bergmann, Nelson, Stephens, and
Bustamante (2008) find that genetic markers differ more strongly between people living
2Referring to Ro¨sti, a popular potato-dish in the German area (but not in the French part) of the
country.
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in Latin Swiss areas and the German Swiss area than within those regions.
This Roestigraben is all the more interesting that it is a sharp geographic border: within
a distance of 5 km, the fraction of French-administratively speaking Swiss municipalities
falls from 100 % to 0% across the border (and vice versa for German-administratively
speaking Swiss municipalities). Furthermore, there is no associated change in geography
at this language border, and large parts of the language border run within Swiss States
(Cantons). This is important since most policies in Switzerland are set at the state (rather
than the federal) level. Thus, within these bilingual states, municipalities of different sides
of the language border face the same regional set of policies and institutions. Within-state
contrasts on either side of the border measure therefore to what extent public authorities
make different make-or-buy decisions for public-services delivery even if they face identical
levels of policy guidelines. From an econometric point of view, these features call for a
spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD), using the Roestigraben, combined with a
within-state estimation strategy (state fixed effects), i.e. we contrast border municipalities
on either side of the segments of the language border that run through states. The
assumption is that within-state municipalities that are just of either side of the border
are very similar (firms and individuals’ location decisions are likely to be balanced) so that
the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be the same across the border3. This allows
us to avoid the omitted variables bias (generally present in studies on public service
delivery) due to the unobserved heterogeneity at the municipal level: the efficiency of
public provision, especially, which might be linked to the language.
Thus, this roestigraben approach strikes us as a near-to-ideal object of inquiry in order
to capture the causal effect of culture on public service delivery, but also to explain the
discrepancy in the share of public employment between Germany and France.
The results show a very large impact of the language border on the modes of provision
of public services in Swiss municipalities. We find that French-speaking border munici-
palities are 50% less likely to contract with the private sector than their German-speaking
adjacent municipalities. Importantly, this effect does not prevail when we do not adopt a
RDD strategy. Our results indicate that the cultural factor is the most important one in
municipalities’ make-or-buy decisions and point out that culture is a source of a potential
bias that distorts the optimal choice for public service delivery.
We also investigate the possible channels to explain the impact of culture, and conclude
that the cultural gap we observe at the language border can be explained by systematic
differences in terms of confidence toward public administration and private firms.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an abbreviated overview of
the institutional background. Section 3 provides a literature review on the determinants
of contracting choices for the provision of public services. Section 4 provides a detailed
description of the data we use while Section 5 presents our estimation results. Section 6
discusses the transmission channels and Section 7 concludes.
3This Roestigraben identification strategy is followed by some studies, e.g. Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer,
and Zweimu¨ller (2011), Eugster and Parchet (2011).
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2 Institutional Background
2.1 Languages in Switzerland
Switzerland was founded in 1291 by the alliance of the three States of Uri, Schwyz
and Nidwalden, the so-called Waldsta¨tten (literally forest States)4. Swiss territory ex-
pended through successive enlargements but remains confined to the German-speaking
area until several campaigns in the first decade of the 15th century leading to the an-
nexation of some Italian-speaking territories in the actual state of Ticino as well as in
the Lombardy and the Piedmont; however, these regions had a status of subject ter-
ritories. The first territorial expansions in the French-speaking occurred as a result of
Burgundian Wars (1474-1477) and the entry of Fribourg in the Confederation (1481). At
the federal level, the Constitution of 1848 recognized German, French and Italian as the
official national languages of the Swiss Confederation. Romansh is also considered as a
national language (since 1938) but it is subject to a special status5. In year 2000, 72.5
percent of Swiss citizens were German-speaking, 21.0 percent French, 4.3 percent Italian
and 0.6 percent Romansh. Amongst the 26 States (Cantons), 4 are French-speaking6,
one is Italian-speaking and 17 are German-speaking. Three states are officially bilingual
French-German (Bern, Fribourg and Valais) and one is trilingual (the Graubu¨nden state:
Romansh, German and Italian). If the French-German border does not correspond to
important topological barriers, the Italian-speaking area for its part is clearly separated
from the other language areas by mountain chains. Finally, in the trilingual Graubu¨nden
state, the language areas correspond mainly to valls.
The Figure 2 displays a map of Switzerland shaded according to the administra-
tive language of each municipality. We can observe in particular a sharp cut off be-
tween French and German areas. Within a distance of 5 km, the fraction of French-
administratively speaking Swiss municipalities falls from 100 % to 0% (and vice versa
for German-administratively speaking Swiss municipalities)7. However, there is no as-
sociated change in geography at this language border, and large parts of the language
border run within Swiss states (cantons). Note also that the administrative language of
municipalities have not changed over time.
2.2 Municipalities in Switzerland
Switzerland is composed of 26 States (Cantons), divided in 184 districts that are fur-
ther divided in 2584 municipalities (in 2010). Compared to other European countries,
Switzerland is one of the countries where the municipalities are amongst the smallest,
with a median size of 1’152 inhabitants and 26.7 percent of municipalities having less
than 500 inhabitants. The smallest municipality (Corippo TI) has only 15 inhabitants,
whereas the biggest, Zurich, has about 370’000 inhabitants.
4The informations provided in this historical part are taken from Bu¨chi (2001) as well as Ducrey
(1983).
5”The official languages of the Confederation shall be German, French and Italian. Romansh shall
also be an official language of the Confederation when communicating with persons who speak Romansh.”
(Art. 70§1 of the Federal Constitution)
6The Jura state is officially a French-speaking State, even if one of its municipalities is German-
speaking.
7To be completely precise, we are aware of one municipality in the French part, called Mont Tramelan,
which administrative language is German since 1952.
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Figure 2: Administrative Language, by Municipality
Source. Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
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The territorial structures have remained essentially unchanged since the creation of
the Federal State in 1848, with the exception of the creation of the Canton of Jura in 1979.
The number of municipalities has only slightly decreased since 1848, decreasing from 3’203
to 2’584, which means a reduction of less than 20 percent. Furthermore, the main part
of this reduction is accounted by a couple of States, especially Thurgau, Fribourg and
Tessin, who have pursued incentive policies to foster voluntary merger of municipalities.
This volontary policy contrasts with some countries who achieved ambitious reforms of the
territorial structures, leading to a drastic reduction of the number of municipalities. This
was the case for example in Belgium who virtually divided the number of its municipalities
by four in 1977, as well as Denmark who divided this number by 2.7 in 2007.
Table 1: Size of Swiss municipalities
Municipalities Inhabitants
Population Number
Cum.
Percentage
Cum.
Number
Cum.
Percentage
Cum.
Number Percentage Number Percentage
0-100 82 82 3.17% 3.17% 5’163 5’163 0.07% 0.07%
101-200 143 225 5.53% 8.71% 21’305 26’468 0.27% 0.34%
201-500 466 691 18.03% 26.74% 160’631 187’099 2.04% 2.38%
501-1’000 504 1’195 19.50% 46.25% 374’739 561’838 4.77% 7.14%
1’001-5’000 1’057 2’252 40.91% 87.15% 2’468’734 3’030’572 31.39% 38.54%
5’001-10’000 194 2’446 7.51% 94.66% 1’344’092 4’374’664 17.09% 55.63%
10-50’000 128 2’574 4.95% 99.61% 2’154’508 6’529’172 27.40% 83.03%
50-100’000 4 2’578 0.15% 99.77% 256’668 6’785’840 3.26% 86.29%
> 100’000 6 2’584 0.23% 100.00% 1’078’172 7’864’012 13.71% 100.00%
Source. Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
The executive power is exerted by an elected government which is headed by a mayor.
As it is the case in the Federal government, the mayor has not extended decision power
than his colleagues, but acts as a primus inter pares. An important feature of Swiss
municipalities is that it is frequent in municipalities — especially the small and medium
ones — that local executive members are not elected as representatives of political parties8.
This mitigates the impact of ideological choices, but more importantly this gives them
a bigger independence and thus greatly reduces the risk of conflicts between the general
interest and partisan interests. On the other hand, there are different modes of legislative
power. In some municipalities, the legislative power is exerted by an elected parliament
whereas in other ones this power is exerted by a general meeting of all citizens. Depending
on the State, the choice of a legislative mode may be left to the municipalities or it may
be imposed by the State. In general, elected parliaments tend to exist in cities and in
larger municipalities whereas general meetings are more common in small to medium
municipalities. Finally, even in municipalities with elected parliaments, citizens may vote
on some issues, through popular initiatives and referenda. The scope of these political
rights are decided at the State level.
8According to Geser, Meuli, Horber-Papazian, Ladner, and Steiner (2012), 39.6% of the 15’000 Swiss
local executive members are not member of any political party, and 4.8% are members of political groups
that only exist at the local level. The proportion of non partisan executive members reaches 80% in
municipalities smaller than 500 inhabitants. Only one executive member of every two is member of one
of the four biggest national parties (Swiss People’s Party, Social Democratic Party, The Liberals, and
Christian Democratic People’s Party).
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3 Literature Review on the Determinants of Govern-
ment Contracting Choices
Both the theoretical and empirical literature related to the make-or-buy decision of
public authorities services divide in two streams, namely an efficiency-based approach
and a public choice approach.
3.1 Efficiency-based determinants
The transaction-cost approach of the make-or-buy decision (above all Williamson (1985))
may be represented as the result of two opposing kinds of forces: centrifugal forces
(economies of scale, costs of internal organization) fostering the market (buy) solution,
and centripetal forces (transaction costs) fostering the internal production (make). Fac-
tors that increase the transaction costs are expected to increase the propensity of public
authorities to keep the provision in-house, or possibly to contract with other public ju-
risdictions. By contrast, factors that reduce transaction costs foster contracting with the
private sector.
Contractual difficulty Knowing that opportunistic behaviour increases transaction
costs, an important issue is to know which parameters foster such behaviour. The first
relevant element is the difficulty of specifying and measuring the outcome. The more
difficult it is for the public authority to specify precisely ex ante in the contract relevant
and measurable properties of the quality of the service considered, the more likely the
private provider will reduce its costs at the expense of the service quality (Hart, 2003).
Moreover, a weak measurability also means that ex post control mechanisms are to be
costly, while at the same time being necessary because of opportunism. As a consequence,
measuring difficulty is a parameter which facilitates opportunistic behaviour, and thus
increases transaction costs. This question has been addressed by Hart, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1997) who showed that, whereas the cost of an inmate is about 10 percent smaller
in private prisons than in public ones, the reason to these economies is to be found
essentially in a reduction in labour costs. Private prisons use to have a smaller staff and
to hire less qualified workers. The consequence of this is that the reported number of
injuries to staff and prisoners as well as the number of incidents of the use of force are
significantly higher in private correctional institutions that in public.
The contracting difficulty is empirically captured through survey data. The results
of the empirical studies are overall in line with the theoretical prediction (Brown and
Potoski (2003), Levin and Tadelis (2010), except for Pouder (1996))9, and the effect can
be substantial: Levin and Tadelis (2010) find that a one standard deviation increase
in contracting difficulty is associated with about forty per cent less private contracting.
In addition, Brown and Potoski (2003) and Levin and Tadelis (2010) show that higher
difficulties in measuring the quality of a service fosters a production by the public sector
through an increase in the propensity to stipulate contracts with other governments. In
other words, measuring difficulty fosters neither the make (in the sense of an internal
production), nor the buy (in the sense of contracting out with the private sector), but an
9These empirical studies analyse the make-or-buy choices based on samples of services in U.S. cities
(10 services in 88 cities in Pouder (1996), 64 services in 1449 cities in Brown and Potoski (2003) and 64
services in 1043 cities in Levin and Tadelis (2010)).
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intermediary solution allowing to take profit from the advantages of contracting out while
at the same time fending off the risks associated with such difficulty.
Uncertainty Renegotiation may have to occur because unforeseen circumstances emerge
over the duration of the contract. This requires an efficient adaptation mechanism for
contractual terms to the extent that opportunistic agents may try to take profit from the
result of changing circumstances. As the adaptation of the contract is costly, the theo-
retical prediction is that uncertainty fosters the make decision, ceteris paribus. Athias
and Saussier (2010) show in particular that high degree of uncertainty anticipated by the
contracting parties (survey-based measured) leads to more flexible price provisions.
Asset specificity Whatever the ease or difficulty of measurement, another essential
factor which fosters opportunism is the so-called hold up problem (Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 1985). This problem occurs when a party
would incur a significant loss if the other party withdrew from the contract. In that case,
the latter would be able to behave opportunistically, putting pressure on the former to
obtain some advantages and threatening it to terminate the contract if it does not accept
to renegotiate the conditions. This ex post asymmetry in bargaining power can occur when
one party has done an important investment in specific assets, e.g. human or physical
assets whose productivity would be significantly lower when used for purposes other than
those initially intended. This investment is then a sunk cost for the firm which has made
it. As a result, higher degree of asset specificity is less likely to be associated with buy
decision, ceteris paribus. Empirical studies most often do not find a clear relationship
between contracting choices and their survey measure of asset specificity. This is mainly
due to issues with their specificity measure. For instance, Brown and Potoski (2003) define
a service as specific if it uses assets that are service-specific, not relationship-specific.
Competition In addition to the transaction costs related issues presented above, an-
other source of inefficiency may come from the lack of competition of the private market.
A large empirical literature supports the intuitive fact that the degree of competition
of the private market is a key issue affecting the relative cost-efficiency of public and
private procurement. Numerous studies show that in the best case, a non-competitive
market, even if it is regulated, does not provide the service at a lower cost than a pub-
lic provider (Fa¨re, Grosskopf, and Logan, 1985; Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1986; Kay and
Thompson, 1986; Parker, 1995; Wallsten, 2001; Zhang, Parker, and Kirkpatrick, 2008).
In the worst case, the private mono- or oligopolist is clearly less cost-efficient than the
public provider. As sketched out by Werkman and Westerling (2000): ”The most im-
portant influence on the performance of an enterprise from the standpoint of efficiency is
competition – not public or private ownership”. Brown and Potoski (2003) included this
factor in their analysis of the size of the cities and their urban status, regardless of the
service. However, the degree of competition might also depend on service characteristics:
even small rural municipalities may have access to a very competitive market for certain
services, whereas some other services face a monopolistic market even for large cities.
3.2 Public Choice determinants
When translating the make-or-buy framework from the industry to the public sector,
the personality of the deciders becomes a critically important issue. In the case of the
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make-or-buy decision for a firm, it is reasonable to assume that there is a convergence
of goals between the decider and the firm. When the decider is a political authority,
this assumption becomes very strong. For Stigler (1971, p.3): ”[P]olitics is an imponder-
able, a constantly and unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of the most diverse nature,
comprending acts of great moral virtue [...] and the most vulgar venality.”
Political ideology The first source of deviation between the social optimum and the
decisions taken by the authority comes from the fact that elected politicians may base
their decisions not only on pragmatic efficiency considerations, but also on their ideological
point of view. This can lead them to contract out public services despite significant
risks and drawbacks, or on contrary to refuse to contract out a service while this would
increase the efficiency and the social welfare. Consequently, the ideological bias may
act towards public provision (make) as well as towards contracting out (buy). Lo´pez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that the voting results obtained in a county
by the Republican candidate at the last gubernatorial election is significantly correlated
with the propensity of this county to contract out services. Levin and Tadelis (2010) for
their part find no significant relationship between the make-or-buy decision in a city and
the voting results in its county. Picazo-Tadeo, Gonza´lez-Go´mez, Wanden-Berghe, and
Ruiz-Villaverde (2012) refine the analysis of ideological motivations firstly in taking into
account the political variables when the decision of contracting out was taken instead of
when the study was run, secondly in taking into account not only the party which was in
power in Andalusian municipalities, but also the fact that this party was in majority or
in minority. In addition, they observe the effects of a discrepancy between the ideology in
the municipality and in its provincial government (that is to say if the right was in power
in the municipality while the left was in power in the province, or vice-versa), as well
as variables related to political cycles and to recently elected governments. This study
confirms that municipalities governed by center-right or center-left parties are significantly
more prone to contracting out than those governed by left-wing parties, regardless of the
fact that the leading party has the majority or not. It also shows that political cycles
matter.
Bel and Fageda (2009) note for their part in their literature review on local govern-
ment choices for the provision of services that, in small municipalities, direct interactions
between elected officials and the citizens have a bigger impact than ideology per se and
conclude that there is no evidence for a systematic impact of ideology on privatization
decisions at the local level. This is particularly true in Switzerland, due to the fact that
a large fraction of local executive members are not members of any political party (cf
supra).
Rent and re-election seeking The cornerstone of rent seeking theories rely on relaxing
the assumption that civil servants and policy makers are benevolent agents who seek
selflessly to serve the interests of the citizens. On the contrary, Public Choice advocates
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Niskanen, 1971; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996) assume
that elected politicians are selfish profit maximisers whose goal is to capture a rent while
ensuring their re-election. From that perspective, policy makers’ contracting choices may
either favour the private sector or not. Municipalities who face strong unions are however
assumed to have a higher propensity to keep the services in the hands of public authorities,
ceteris paribus. In addition, policy makers are less likely to contract with the private sector
particularly salient services, for which resident sensitivity to quality is high.
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In a study based on 12 services in U.S. counties, Lo´pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997) focused on the so-called Clean Government Laws (purchasing standards, merit sys-
tem, prohibition of political activities for civil servants). They find that clean government
laws foster the private provision of public services. However, the positive correlation be-
tween clean government laws and the propensity to privatize may also be explained by
the fact that these laws in fact increase the cost of the public procurement, making it less
competitive against private procurement. Levin and Tadelis (2010) for their part found
different effects depending on which law is observed. Whereas the prohibition of politi-
cal activity by city employees shows the same effect as in Lo´pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny’s (1997) study, they observe a totally opposite effect, albeit weakly significant, for
the existence of a merit system. For her part, Kodrzycki (1998) found no significant im-
pact of clean government laws on the decision to contract with the private sector. Finally,
Brown and Potoski (2003) as well as Levin and Tadelis (2010) found that municipalities
governed by appointed managers were significantly more prone to contract with the pri-
vate sector than those governed by elected mayors, who are subject to reelection. They
also show a significant connection between the make-or-buy decision and the sensitivity
of the citizens to the quality of the service. These results are in line with previous results
from Warner and Hebdon (2001) who also showed that sensitivity is a relevant element to
retain municipalities to contract services with the private sector. In other words, politi-
cally salient services are more likely to be delivered in-house as they are part of politicians’
electoral constraint.
City Finances The relationship between contracting decisions and efficiency-based con-
siderations might also be dulled by the city’s financial condition. It is often argued that
contracting with the private sector is a good way to alleviate the budget of public au-
thorities because a part more or less important of founds comes from the private sector.
But this argument is doubtful due to the Ricardian Equivalence: The resources saved by
the government by not paying the investment should be equal, in present value, to the
revenue foregone to the private provider. Thus, the political view would suggest that if
cities have an important debt, they may be more likely to contract the service provision
with the private sector.
4 Data
4.1 Contracting Choices of Swiss Municipalities
We collected data on the contracting choices of Swiss municipalities by survey. The
survey asks city administrators to identify the mode of provision their municipality had
chosen to provide each of the 22 services we were interested in (reported in Table 2).
We selected the most important services at the local level, ranging from very simple
ones (public works and office cleaning) to more complex ones (safety, education). The
various modes of provision are: in-house provision (either by city employees or by a public
company), contracting with another public agency (which also includes local government
associations), contracting with a private sector firm, and other forms (the services is
provided by another level of government, or by non-for-profit organizations). Finally,
the service can also not be provided by the State, i.e. the provision is left entirely to
the market (pure privatization). We view public contracts as a substitute for in-house
provision for a city that is too small to provide a certain service effectively but which
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Table 2: The 22 services
Office cleaning Sewage treatment
Snow-cleaning Child day-care centres
Road-clearing School canteen
Road maintenance Specialized services in school
Parking control Maintenance of school buildings
Refuse collection Security in public spaces
Solid waste disposal Local parks and gardens
Animal carcases removal Cemeteries
Street lights Trimming of trees
Drinking water distribution Forests
Maintenance of water facilities Public transport
wants to retain more control over provision than may be the case with a private provider.
We obtained responses from 377 municipalities among which 54% are German-speaking
and 46% are French-speaking. The relevant subsample for the purpose of this study is
that of the three bilingal States (Berne, Fribourg and Valais), i.e. 142 municipalities
among which 84 are German-speaking and 58 are French-speaking.
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for our dependant variable. In our whole
sample, 52% of the services provided are provided in house, 23% through contracts with
the private sector and 22% through contracts with other public entities. The distribution
within French-speaking municipalities is quite similar (49% in-house, 22% public contract-
ing, 25% private contracting) although the share of services privately provided is a little
bit higher. By contrast, we can observe that, within German-speaking municipalities,
less services are provided by the private sector (21% of the services provided) and more
services are provided in-house (54%).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the modes of provision (provided services only)
All German French
Mean Min Mean Min Mean Min
(Std dev.) Max (Std dev.) Max (Std dev.) Max
Services provided 18.592 0 18.250 10 19.088 13
(2.782) 22 (2.212) 22 (2.081) 22
– In House 10.021 0 10.095 2 9.914 0
(3.568) 18 (3.284) 18 (3.971) 16
– Public contract 4.134 0 4.012 0 4.281 0
(2.304) 13 (2.300) 10 (2.328) 10
– Private contract 3.880 0 3.655 0 4.158 0
(2.380) 22 (2.352) 10 (2.396) 10
– Other 0.556 0 0.488 0 0.667 0
(0.911) 6 (0.814) 3 (1.041) 4
Observations 2640 1533 1107
Municipalities 142 84 58
The repartition of the modes of provision for each service is provided in Fig.3. We
can observe that there is an important variation of contracting choices across services,
even though the three procuring methods are used in all services. Some services such as
maintenance of school buildings are provided by municipal employees in 91% of the mu-
nicipalities of our sample. Other services such as refuse collection are privately contracted
12
Figure 3: Modes of provision by services
over 65% of the time. Specialized services in school, sewage treatments, forests mainte-
nance and animal carcases removal services are in a majority of municipalities publicly
contracted. The service with the lowest share of municipalities resorting to the private
provision is specialized services in school (e.g. school psychologists, logopedics).
4.2 Service and Municipality Characteristics
Our data consist in both Municipal, Service and Municipal×Service variables taken
from different sources.
A central prediction of efficiency-based theories is that difficulties in specifying and
monitoring performance requirements are likely to reduce private provision. To quantify
these difficulties, we surveyed ten city administrators as well as MBA students (to pro-
vide some external validity) asking them to assess the 22 services along four contracting
dimensions: (1) the difficulty of specifying in the contract the expected service and the
13
quality requirements (ex-ante contracting difficulty); (2) the difficulty of observing and
measuring the quality of the service once provided (ex-post contracting difficulty); (3)
the difficulty in replacing contractors due to knowledge or physical specificity; (4) the
burden laid by the service on the municipal budget (to capture economies of scale when
contracting the service provision). We standardized the answers of each respondent for
all questions to have zero mean and unit variance. We then averaged the standardized
responses to construct an average response to each question for each service. There was a
tight correlation between the survey responses of different city administrators and MBA
students, which corroborates our implicit assumption that dimensions of contracting dif-
ficulty are largely related to service characteristics rather than being idiosyncratic to a
given municipality-service pair. However, the first three contracting dimensions turn out
to be so highly correlated across services as to be nearly collinear in multivariate regression
analysis. Therefore for the regression analysis we use a principal components approach
to identify a single contracting difficulty variable. The first principal component explains
74% of the variation in our four survey variables.
In addition to asking the set of ten city administrators about these four dimensions
(which denote Service aspects), we included three questions in the survey sent to every
city administrator to know the provision mode of services, in order to capture Service ×
Municipality aspects. We asked them to assess (1) the sensitivity of residents to the quality
of each service; (2) the uncertainty surrounding the future requirements of each service;
(3) the level of competition for each service if they were considering contracting with a
private sector firm the service provision. We assume hence that these three dimensions
are idiosyncratic to individual municipality-service pairs. Indeed, the citizens of a large
urban municipality have different needs for some services than the citizens of a mountain
village or of a small municipality in the countryside. Hence, it is highly likely that
their sensitivity is quite different. In the same way, uncertainty also changes from one
municipality to another, due to, for instance, the fact that a municipality is experiencing
strong demographic growth or increasing urbanization or not. Finally, municipalities
of different sizes or in different regions face different transportation infrastructures and
different markets, and hence face different degrees of competition. We standardized each
variable (Sensitivity, Competition and Uncertainty) to have zero mean and unit variance.
Table 4 reports service characteristics. The first five columns report overall contracting
difficulty and its four components. The sixth column reports the budget weight of each
service. The last three columns report the means by service of the variables uncertainty,
sensitivity and competition. The relative difficulties of contracting for some services are
in line with our intuition. For instance, office cleaning and buildings maintenance are
two of the easiest services to contract. These services are routine, easy to measure and
monitor and do not involve a great deal of specialized equipment or knowledge. Child
day care centres and specialized services in school are two of the most difficult services to
contract. For both services, performance is difficult to assess accurately and specialized
knowledge can play an important role. We also observe that services provided directly to
citizens are, as expected, subject to a bigger sensitivity than internal services (e.g. office
cleaning). This is particularly true for services that directly affect the everyday life (refuse
collection, drinking water distribution, snow cleaning).
For each municipality, we also collected information from official sources on the size
of the population10 (as municipalities may need to be a certain size to produce a given
10As the number of large municipalities is quite low, we chose to cluster the size of population in
three classes — small (≤1500) , medium (1501-5000), big (<5000) — instead of using it as a continuous
14
service in-house with any sort of efficiency), the area, the local per capita yield of the
Federal Direct Tax (FDT, as a proxy for income), the municipal dependency ratio (as a
proxy for investment needs), the municipality passive interests per capita (as a measure
of indebtedness). Finally, we control for religion with a binary variable Catholic taking
the value 1 if the number of Catholics in the municipality is bigger than the number of
Protestants. Table 5 presents a summary of municipality characteristics.
5 Estimation and Results
5.1 Estimation
We want to quantify the relationship between the alternative forms of service provi-
sion and efficiency-based factors, public choice factors, and cultural factors. In order to
describe the choice between the three alternatives, we use a standard multinomial logit ap-
proach combined with a spatial regression discontinuity design11. In the following model,
we compare the probability that municipality i provides service j using the provision
mode m ∈ {Private contracting, Public contracting} against the base category In-House:
ln
[
Pr(Yij = m)
Pr(Yij = InHouse)
]
= αlm + δmFi +
2∑
k=1
βlkmD
k
i +
2∑
k=1
βrkmD
k
i · Fi+
Eff’ijγm + Polit’ijζm + X’ijηm + ijm,∀m, (1)
with Fi, for French, being a dummy taking the value 1 for French-speaking municipalities.
The running variable Di, for Distance, which measures the distance to the closest cross-
border municipality, takes positive values for French-speaking municipalities (at the right,
r, of the language border) and negative values for municipalities in the German side
(at the left, l, of the language border)12. We allow for different spatial trends. When
the variable Di takes the value 0, our measure of culture changes discontinuously at the
language border. Effij is a vector of efficiency-based variables, Politij is a vector of public
choice variables and finally Xij is a vector of additional controls, including State fixed
effects (dummies). Note that the vector Effij includes Service and Service×Muncipality
variables, Politij encompasses Municipality and Service×Muncipality variables and Xij
encompasses Muncipality and Service variables.
The key parameter in this regression is δm. Indeed, δm estimates the contrast in
the probability of contracting choices at the border, that is, the difference in the mean
probability of contracting choices between French and German-speaking municipalities at
the border (i.e., when Di = 0).
αlm measures the mean of the outcome variable in French-speaking border munici-
palities if they were German-speaking. The parameters βlkm measure the spatial trend
in contracting choices outcomes in the Swiss German area, whereas the parameters βrkm
allow for a completely different spatial trend in the French area.
variable, so as to avoid heteroscedasticity.
11See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a comprehensive discussion of spatial regression discontinuity design.
12To implement the local border contrast, we determined each municipality’s distance to the language
border. To do so, we computed the Euclidian distance, using geodata provided by the Swiss Federal
Office of Topography, to proxy for economic distance between pairs of cross-border municipalities. We
then took the nearest cross-border neighbour as the value for the distance to the language border.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Services
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Municipalities
Mean Std Dev Min Max Source of the data
City × Service characteristics
Sensitivity 0.00 1.00 -1.10 1.75 Athias Wicht Municipal survey
Uncertainty 0.00 1.00 -1.17 2.57 Athias Wicht Municipal survey
Competition 0.00 1.00 -1.28 2.38 Athias Wicht restricted survey
City characteristics Athias Wicht Municipal survey
Size
Small Medium Big
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
0.44 0.38 0.18
Urban
Urban Rural Swiss Federal Statistical Office: ”Niveaux
0.39 0.61 ge´ographiques de la Suisse 2012”
FDT Yield p.c. [1000 CHF] 1.17 1.40 0.13 12.2 Federal Tax Administration
Dependency ratio 64.79 8.79 22.2 85.3 Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Debt 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.13 State and municipal Finance Offices
Mountain
Yes No Swiss Federal Statistical Office: ”Niveaux
0.49 0.51 ge´ographiques de la Suisse 2012”
Catholic
Yes No Swiss Federal Statistical Office
0.40 0.60
Number of municipalities: 142.
In order to capture the pure effect of the language, we focus on the three bilingual
States (Bern, Fribourg and Valais) to the extent that French and German municipalities
of a same State face the same institutional framework, which we capture through State
fixed effects. We confine the analysis on the municipalities located not more than 40 km
from the language border. In order to check for the robustness of our results, we run our
regressions with different ad-hoc bandwidths of 20, 25, 30 and 40 km, with both a linear
spatial trend for all distances and and a quadratic spatial trend at 30 and 40 km. This
model is estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
To check the robustness of our results, we also run a logit regression, merging the
categories Public contracting and In-House provision, thus directly opposing private and
public provision, with an identical specification. In this case, we are able to estimate the
model with robust standard errors clustered at both the municipal and service levels.
5.2 Estimation Issues
The key identifying assumption of our RDD is that factors other than culture — that
potentially influence municipalities’ make-or-buy decisions — do not change discontinu-
ously at the language border. In other words, the assumption boils down to conditional
independence of outcome and potential language group membership at the language bor-
der.
This assumption is plausible for the segments of the language border that run through
States. As already highlighted above, States have much discretion in setting legal and
policy rules. But the within-State segments allow us to adopt a within-State estimation
strategy, that is, to add State fixed effects. Appendix C.1 provides evidence that is
consistent with this assumption.
5.3 Results
Throughout the paper, rather than reporting hard-to-interpret coefficients from the
logit model, we report the marginal effects on the choice probabilities. Table 6 reports
results from the fully specified RDD multinomial logit with different spatial specifications
(20, 25, 30 and 40 km linear and 30 and 40 quadratic). Table 7 reports results from logit
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regressions as a robustness check. Table 8 reports results from our model without spatial
trend, the cultural aspect being operationalized only through the binary variable French.
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. The RDD approach allows
us to observe the effect of the language border at identical actual set of policies and in-
stitutions and at identical actual relative efficiency of public and private provision. This
effect is substantial: French-speaking border municipalities are around 50% less likely
to contract with the private sector than their German-speaking adjacent municipalities
(recall that on average about 23% of services are contracted privately and the estimated
probability change is between -11 and -17 percentage points depending on the specifi-
cation). We do not observe a robust evidence of an impact of the language border in
the propensity to contract with the public sector. These results are confirmed when we
merge the categories public contracting and in-house provision and run a (binary) logit
regression, thus opposing private and public provision (Table 7). Once again, French
municipalities exhibit a significantly and substantially lower propensity to contract the
provision of their services with the private sector. The marginal effects associated with
distance or distance times language are for their part not significant, neither in multino-
mial logit nor in binary logit. Interestingly, no effect of culture can be observed without
the RDD approach (Table 8). Thus, the cultural dimension is important and significant
and might not be orthogonal to the efficiency-based dimensions, which might introduce a
bias in government choices.
Regarding the efficiency-based predictions, they are partly corroborated. First, we
observe, as expected, that greater contracting difficulty – services for which it is harder to
write and administer performance contracts – is associated with more public contracting
and less private sector contracting. This finding is consistent with Brown and Potoski
(2003) and Levin and Tadelis (2010). The impact of contracting difficulty on public con-
tracting might be explained by the fact that public contracting is a substitute for in-house
provision for a municipality that wishes to take advantage of economies of scale while re-
taining more control over provision for services for which the contracting difficulty is high.
However, the marginal impact is rather low and much lower than in Levin and Tadelis
(2010) : A one standard deviation increase in contracting difficulty is associated with a
change in the probability of being contracted with the private sector of 6%. Second, we
find a striking effect of competition. Municipalities facing a strong competitive private
sector market for a given service are significantly more prone to contract it with private
firms, which is in line with our expectations. More precisely, a one standard deviation
change in the perceived degree of private sector competition is associated with 22% in-
crease in the likelihood of private contracting. This is the variable which has the most
important effect on the likelihood of private contracting after the cultural variable. The
fact that we observe a negative impact of competition on public contracting suggests that
public contracting acts as a substitute for private contracting when the degree of compe-
tition is low. Third, we observe that services for which future requirements are difficult
to anticipate (variable Uncertainty) are more often contracted with private sector firms.
This result is not in line with the prediction according to which uncertainty is associated
with higher transaction costs. It may suggest that municipalities try to outsource to a
third part the risks associated with uncertainty (e.g. the risk of having an over- or under-
capacity in the future). This might however improve productive efficiency if the third
part is best able to manage this risk at the lowest cost, i.e. is best able to affect the risky
outcome and minimise any negative impact of the underlying uncertainty on the project
(Debande, 2002; Va¨lila¨, 2005). Our results suggest that municipalities think that private
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Table 6: RDD-Multinomial Logit Models for Frequency of Private and Public Contracting
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Table 7: RDD-Logit Models for Frequency of Private Contracting
25 km 30 km 30 km 40 km 40 km
Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Cultural aspects
French -0.1299*** -0.1138** -0.1687*** -0.1041** -0.1125**
(0.0449) (0.0466) (0.0562) (0.0452) (0.0556)
Dist 0.0016 0.0003 0.0032 0.0006 0.0009
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0034)
French × Dist 0.0019 0.0022 0.011 0.0031 0.0045
(0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0107) (0.0022) (0.0095)
Dist2 0.0001** 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
French × Dist2 -0.0005** -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Efficiency
Contracting diff. -0.0162 -0.0188 -0.0186 -0.0195 -0.0194
(0.0279) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0302) (0.0302)
Uncertainty 0.0448*** 0.0443*** 0.0444*** 0.0384*** 0.0382***
(0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0147)
Competition 0.0481** 0.055** 0.0549** 0.0538** 0.0539**
(0.0238) (0.0251) (0.025) (0.0239) (0.0241)
Political
Sensitivity 0.0177 0.0182 0.0183 0.0243 0.0243
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.018) (0.0181)
Control
Big -0.0722** -0.0761** -0.0679** -0.0894*** -0.0891***
(0.0333) (0.0321) (0.0345) (0.0298) (0.0305)
Small 0.0114 0.0066 0.007 -0.0076 -0.007
(0.0308) (0.0305) (0.0309) (0.0297) (0.0317)
Urban -0.0044 -0.0131 -0.0086 -0.0219 -0.0215
(0.02) (0.0181) (0.0175) (0.0202) (0.0198)
FDT Yield p.c. 0.0301 0.0387 0.0362 0.04 0.04
(0.0242) (0.0237) (0.0242) (0.0263) (0.0267)
Budget weight 0.0253 0.03 0.0295 0.034 0.034
(0.0387) (0.0398) (0.0395) (0.0385) (0.0383)
Dependency ratio 0.0041 0.0046** 0.0045* 0.0028 0.0027
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Mountain 0.0425* 0.037** 0.0364** 0.0283 0.0273
(0.0229) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0205) (0.0197)
Catholic -0.034 -0.0402 -0.0599 -0.0448 -0.0476
(0.0411) (0.0425) (0.0393) (0.0422) (0.0415)
Debt -0.5898 -0.4315 -0.4691 -0.3592 -0.3677
(0.671) (0.6538) (0.6431) (0.5874) (0.5946)
Observations 1627 1809 1809 2157 2157
Municipalities 91 100 100 120 120
French/German 45/46 46/54 46/54 50/70 50/70
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects on probability of private contracting. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the municipality and service levels. All regressions include State
dummies. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Multinomial Logit Models for Frequency of Private and Public Contracting,
without RDD
P
u
b
li
c
P
ri
v
a
te
P
u
b
li
c
P
ri
v
a
te
P
u
b
li
c
P
ri
v
a
te
P
u
b
li
c
P
ri
v
a
te
P
u
b
li
c
P
ri
v
a
te
P
u
b
li
c
P
ri
v
a
te
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
o
n
tr
.
C
u
lt
u
ra
l
a
sp
ec
ts
F
re
n
c
h
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
1
7
8
-0
.0
1
8
8
-0
.0
0
9
1
-0
.0
2
4
2
0
.0
0
5
8
-0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
1
4
7
-0
.0
2
7
3
-0
.0
1
3
8
-0
.0
3
0
3
(0
.0
2
8
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
3
1
9
)
(0
.0
2
7
6
)
(0
.0
2
7
3
)
(0
.0
3
0
4
)
(0
.0
2
9
2
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
3
1
5
)
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
5
)
(0
.0
3
7
3
)
E
ffi
c
ie
n
c
y
C
o
n
tr
a
c
ti
n
g
d
iff
.
0
.0
6
8
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
9
0
.0
6
9
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
6
9
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
1
0
.0
6
9
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
2
0
.0
7
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
8
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
U
n
c
e
rt
a
in
ty
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
4
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
4
0
.0
4
4
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
5
0
.0
4
4
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
4
0
.0
4
4
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
3
0
.0
4
4
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
5
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
2
)
C
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
o
n
-0
.0
8
4
*
*
*
0
.0
5
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
5
4
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
5
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
9
8
*
*
*
0
.0
5
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
5
5
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
1
5
)
(0
.0
1
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
1
5
)
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
S
e
n
si
ti
v
it
y
-0
.0
0
9
4
0
.0
2
8
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
2
0
.0
2
8
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
2
0
.0
2
9
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
.0
3
0
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
0
.0
2
0
8
*
*
(0
.0
0
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
D
e
b
t
-0
.1
6
8
-1
.0
9
6
7
*
0
.0
7
5
9
-0
.8
6
9
8
0
.1
6
6
4
-0
.8
8
2
6
0
.2
9
0
8
-0
.7
1
8
1
0
.2
8
2
1
-0
.7
0
2
5
(0
.5
2
9
2
)
(0
.6
1
7
4
)
(0
.5
0
4
8
)
(0
.6
1
6
9
)
(0
.4
7
9
2
)
(0
.6
2
2
)
(0
.4
8
7
6
)
(0
.6
2
9
7
)
(0
.4
8
7
)
(0
.6
2
9
3
)
C
o
n
tr
o
l
B
ig
-0
.0
3
3
8
-0
.0
8
0
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
5
8
*
-0
.0
6
9
3
*
*
-0
.0
7
1
8
*
*
-0
.0
7
9
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
1
5
*
*
-0
.0
7
9
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
6
4
)
(0
.0
2
9
4
)
(0
.0
3
1
7
)
(0
.0
2
9
4
)
(0
.0
3
4
4
)
(0
.0
2
7
4
)
(0
.0
3
4
5
)
(0
.0
2
7
2
)
S
m
a
ll
0
.0
8
2
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
5
0
.1
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
7
1
0
.1
1
2
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
3
5
0
.1
1
2
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
2
4
(0
.0
2
4
5
)
(0
.0
2
3
9
)
(0
.0
2
6
5
)
(0
.0
2
5
4
)
(0
.0
2
7
1
)
(0
.0
2
6
1
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
6
1
)
U
rb
a
n
0
.0
8
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
5
*
0
.0
9
0
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
3
8
*
0
.0
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
3
4
*
(0
.0
2
7
6
)
(0
.0
2
3
6
)
(0
.0
2
8
8
)
(0
.0
2
3
7
)
(0
.0
2
8
8
)
(0
.0
2
3
6
)
M
o
u
n
ta
in
-0
.0
4
8
6
*
0
.0
0
8
3
-0
.0
3
8
3
0
.0
2
1
9
-0
.0
3
8
3
0
.0
2
1
6
(0
.0
2
7
1
)
(0
.0
2
5
3
)
(0
.0
2
9
3
)
(0
.0
2
4
9
)
(0
.0
2
9
3
)
(0
.0
2
4
9
)
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
y
ra
ti
o
-0
.0
0
0
9
0
.0
0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
3
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
F
D
T
Y
ie
ld
p
.c
.
0
.0
3
2
3
0
.0
4
3
5
0
.0
3
1
6
0
.0
4
3
3
(0
.0
3
0
2
)
(0
.0
2
6
9
)
(0
.0
3
0
3
)
(0
.0
2
6
5
)
C
a
th
o
li
c
0
.0
5
9
6
-0
.0
3
6
1
0
.0
5
8
4
-0
.0
3
5
(0
.0
5
7
5
)
(0
.0
3
8
7
)
(0
.0
5
7
2
)
(0
.0
3
8
8
)
B
u
d
g
e
t
w
e
ig
h
t
-0
.0
0
4
3
0
.0
4
0
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
1
3
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
5
6
1
2
5
6
1
2
3
5
5
2
3
5
5
2
3
5
5
2
3
5
5
2
3
5
5
2
3
5
5
2
3
5
5
2
3
5
5
2
3
5
5
2
3
5
5
M
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
e
s
1
4
2
1
4
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
F
re
n
c
h
/
G
e
rm
a
n
5
8
/
8
4
5
8
/
8
4
5
1
/
8
1
5
1
/
8
1
5
1
/
8
1
5
1
/
8
1
5
1
/
8
1
5
1
/
8
1
5
1
/
8
1
5
1
/
8
1
5
1
/
8
1
5
1
/
8
1
N
o
te
s:
R
e
p
o
rt
e
d
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
a
re
m
a
rg
in
a
l
e
ff
e
c
ts
o
n
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
d
iff
e
re
n
t
m
o
d
e
s
o
f
se
rv
ic
e
p
ro
v
is
io
n
.
In
-h
o
u
se
p
ro
v
is
io
n
is
th
e
b
a
se
o
u
tc
o
m
e
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
a
re
c
lu
st
e
re
d
a
t
th
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
le
v
e
l.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
S
ta
te
d
u
m
m
ie
s.
∗p
<
0
.1
0
,
∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗
∗
∗p
<
0
.0
1
.
21
firms have more skills to manage the risks happening during the operation phases.
Results related to public choice predictions are mitigated. We find no effect of munici-
pality finances on make-or-buy decisions (Debt variable) and we find a significant positive
correlation between private contracting and the measure of resident sensitivity to quality,
which is not consistent with the view that municipalities want control over the services
that are more salient for the residents. This might be however consistent with the view
that public authorities resort to private contracting to reduce their accountability (see
Ellman (2006) and Athias (2013) for theoretical insights into this issue).
Regarding control variables, we find a striking pattern in municipality size. We observe
that, compared to medium-sized municipalities, large municipalities are significantly less
prone to contract both with the private and the public sector. Small municipalities for
their part are more prone to contract with other public entities, but exhibit no significant
impact towards private contracting. These results are to be explained by the fact that large
municipalities have the critical size to provide local public services by themselves whereas
medium-sized and small municipalities have to contract to take advantage of economies
of scale. Moreover, small municipalities do not always dispose from sufficient means and
competencies to manage efficiently certain services. Turning to a logit model, we observe
no significant impact of size for small municipalities. This element, as well as the fact that
we observe no impact on private contracting in the multinomial model regarding small
municipalities, suggest that small municipalities use exclusively public contracting (inter
alia Local Government Associations) as a substitute for in-house provision. Regarding
large municipalities, the results of the logit estimation also confirm the results of the
multinomial logit.
6 Possible Explanations
This Section discusses one potential channel by which cultural background translates
into lower implication of the private sector in the provision of public services on the French
side of the language border. This channel is systematic differences in the confidence in
the public and private sectors.
Using data from the World Value Survey 2007, we compare the answers given by
French-Swiss and German-Swiss respondents when they were asked to rate How much
confidence do you have in the Civil Service and How much confidence do you have in major
companies. The first question wants to measure individual’s confidence towards the public
administration while the second wants to measure individual’s confidence towards the
private firms. Results are reported in Table 9. In both cases, we observe that French-Swiss
respondents are less confident than German-Swiss respondents, although the difference
is bigger (and more significant) regarding companies. More interesting is to observe the
discrepancy between the individual levels of confidence in companies and the Civil service.
This allows us to control for individual characteristics. This shows that on average,
German-Swiss respondents have higher confidence in major companies than in the public
administration, whereas it is the exact opposite for French-Swiss respondents, and the
difference is significant. These results are confirmed when we run ordered logit regressions
for each question, so as to control for individual characteristics (see Appendix A). These
results suggest that individual preferences relative to the private and public sectors exhibit
clear differences across both language group memberships. Hence, individual preferences
are a potential channel of transmission of cultural traits that might explain the gap that
we observe in the make-or-buy decisions of Swiss municipalities.
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Table 9: Comparison of survey results between German-Swiss and French-Swiss respon-
dents
Question Data #
Resp.
Mean
German
Mean
French
Mean
Total
Diff. Pr(Diff 6=0)
1. How much confi-
dence do you have
in: The Civil Ser-
vice
WVS
(2007)
902 2.565
(0.7253
2.683
(0.707)
2.636
(0.715)
-0.119 0.015** From (1) = A
great deal to
(4) = None at
all
2. How much confi-
dence do you have
in: Major compa-
nies
WVS
(2007)
890 2.467
(0.719)
2.780
(0.757)
2.658
(0.757)
-0.313 0.000*** From (1) = A
great deal to
(4) = None at
all
3. Discrepancy be-
tween the con-
fidence towards
Public adminis-
tration (Q2) and
Companies (Q3)
859 -0.095
(0.8146)
0.094
(0.8201)
0.020
(0.823)
-0.189 0.001*** Positive value
= more confi-
dence towards
Public admin-
istration
These different views can be reinforced by the feedback mechanism highlighted by
Piketty (1995) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2006). Indeed, actual differences in the modes
of provision of public services lead to choices that reinforce diverging confidence in public
administration and private firms. This interplay of beliefs and real-life experience with
respect to private provision has been investigated by Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky
(2012). In this paper, the authors try to assess the effect of propaganda versus reality
in the formation of beliefs about privatization. They run a lab experiment immediately
after the re-nationalization in 2006 of the main water company in Argentina. Within
people who did not have access to water before ”privatization”, they distinguish two
groups of people: (1) those who obtained access after privatization; (2) those who did not
obtain access. They want to explain the difference of opinions between the benefits of
privatization of water services and benefits of privatization in general (so as to control for
individual characteristics). They show that a person’s beliefs of the benefits of the water
privatization were almost 30% more negative (relative to other privatizations) if his/her
household did not gain access to water after the privatization. Thus, reality can change
beliefs.
7 Conclusion
While it might seem natural to consider that cultural factors are not the principal
determinants to explain economic decisions, our paper shows that the economic choices
— make-or-buy decision — made by municipalities for the provision of their services are
mainly explained by cultural factors. We focus on the language border in Switzerland
to capture the pure effect of culture on make-or-buy decisions of Swiss municipalities,
using a regression discontinuity design. We disentangle between three accounts for the
make-or-buy decisions: efficiency-based determinants, public choice determinants, and
cultural determinants. Our results show that cultural factors deeply shape municipalities
decisions. French-speaking border municipalities are 50% less likely to choose the private
provision than their German-speaking adjacent municipalities. This result points out
that culture is a source of potential bias that distorts the optimal choice for public service
delivery.
We explain this cultural gap between French-speaking Swiss municipalities and German-
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speaking Swiss municipalities by systematic differences in confidence in public administra-
tion and private firms between French-Swiss and German-Swiss citizens. Using data from
the World Value Survey 2007, we observe that German-Swiss respondents have higher
confidence in private companies than in public administration, whereas French-Swiss re-
spondents have higher confidence in public administration than in private companies, and
the difference is highly significant.
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Appendix
A Culture and Confidence
(1) (2) (3)
Civil Service Companies ∆Confidence
French 0.310** 0.738*** 0.398***
(0.136) (0.138) (0.145)
Male 0.273** -0.173** -0.461***
(0.134) (0.0783) (0.132)
< 30 yrs old -0.103 -0.226 -0.120
(0.190) (0.161) (0.134)
≥ 50 yrs old -0.166 0.0966 0.292**
(0.147) (0.139) (0.139)
Lower educ. level 0.189 0.0504 -0.102
(0.177) (0.270) (0.268)
Upper educ. level -0.0425 -0.0624 -0.0919
(0.228) (0.336) (0.262)
Catholic -0.0889 -0.405*** -0.241*
(0.141) (0.136) (0.127) )
Raised religiously -0.431*** -0.0255 0.304***
(0.139) (0.137) (0.0981)
Married -0.160 -0.150 0.00136
(0.142) (0.110) (0.167)
Observations 875 864 835
Ordered logit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at
State level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <
0.1. Positive coefficients mean negative impact on confidence
(cols 1-2). Positive coeff. mean higher confidence towards civil
service compared to major companies (col. 3).
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Contracting diff. 1.000
Sensitivity 0.191 1.000
Uncertainty 0.343 0.209 1.000
Budget weight 0.648 0.312 0.217 1.000
FDT Yield p.c. 0.000 0.018 0.050 0.001 1.000
Dep. Ratio 0.001 0.028 0.024 -0.001 -0.103 1.000
Debt 0.000 0.033 0.019 0.002 -0.116 -0.089 1.000
Competition -0.242 0.043 -0.052 -0.183 0.031 0.016 0.074
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C Robustness checks
C.1 Continuity of explanatory variables at the language border
A key issue in regression discontinuity designs is that all other explanatory variables
do not exhibit any discontinuity at the cutoff. In order to check the balance of covariates
at the language border, we estimate the following regression model:
Yi = α0 + α1 · Fi + α2 ·Di + α3 · Fi ×Di + X′iβ + εi (2)
where Yi is the variable to test for municipality i, Fi a dummy taking the value 1 for
French municipalities and Di the distance to the language border. X’i is a vector of State
dummies. For binary variables, we use a logit model with the same specification.
Results are provided in Table 10. Column 1 reports the mean of a characteristic in the
French region, column 2 reports the corresponding mean in the German region, column 3
reports the contrast Swiss French versus Swiss German municipalities, column 4 provides
an estimate of the local contrast with a bandwidth of 25 km. In columns 1 and 2, standard
deviations are in parentheses; in columns 3 and 4, for municipality data, heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors are in parentheses whereas for municipality-service characteristics
(uncertainty, sensitivity, competition), standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level.
Table 10: How do border municipalities compare?
Mean Mean Difference Difference
French German All 25 km, linear
FDT Yield p.c. [1000 CHF]
0.809 0.613 0.196** 0.133
(0.092) (0.046) (0.094) (0.144)
Dependency ratio
66.410 66.689 2.721* 8.710***
(1.063) (0.989) (1.482) (0.028)
Debt
0.038 0.031 0.012 -.010***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.020)
Mountain
0.517 0.512 -0.005 -0.523***
(0.163)
Catholic
0.828 0.107 -0.720*** 1.850***
(0.163)
Urban
0.225 0.357 -0.132* -0.128
(0.199)
Small
0.569 0.405 0.164 0.399**
(0.187)
Medium
0.345 0.417 -0.072 -0.244
(0.199)
Big
0.086 0.179 -0.093 -0.156
(0.152)
Uncertainty
0.131 -0.147 0.278*** 0.483**
(0.029) (0.022) (0.043) (0.194)
Sensitivity
-0.069 -0.079 -0.010 -0.154
(0.035) (0.033) (0.049) (0.187)
Competition
-0.052 -0.163 0.110*** 0.366*
(0.027) (0.022) (0.035) (0.197)
Number of municipalities 174 225 92
Number of observations 3823 4934 1645
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Results indicate that there are significant but slight differences in age structure at
the language border. Swiss French border municipalities are also most often smaller
than their German neighbours. While there is no significant difference between French
and German municipalities of the whole sample, there are significant differences between
border municipalities, with a higher rate for private sector competition within French
border municipalities. This might be explained by the fact that there are more German
border municipalities in a mountain area than French ones (which can impede access to
markets and make transportation less efficient).
Regarding the degree of competition, we observe a stronger competition in the French
area. This may be a factor explaining why we observe a higher proportion of services
contracted out in the French area, while at the same time observing a pure effect of the
language border going in the opposite direction. The same is true regarding the variable
Uncertainty. hence, these results confirm the importance of controlling for these variables
in our models.
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